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Introduction

A continuing question in the study of conflict and conflict management is, “When is
conflict helpful, and when is it harmful?” Though many have offered explanations for this (Jehn,
Northcraft, & Neale, 1999), data in support of these notions have been less forthcoming,
especially in relation to the helpfulness of conflict (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). In this paper we
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present a dynamic model of conflict that we hope will both explain and clarify the confusion by
conceptualizing conflict as simultaneously containing helpful (learning related) and harmful
(negative sentiment related) components. We argue how both learning and negative emotion can
inhibit or promote future conflict, constituting feedback loops. We then examine what this
implies for conflict over time in terms of the efficacy of collaboration between parties who
experience conflict.
Traditionally “helpful” conflict has been called task conflict or cognitive conflict, while
the “harmful” type of conflict is relationship or emotional conflict (Amason, 1996; Amason &
Sapienza, 1997; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Jehn & Mannix, 2001)1. Task conflict is centered on the
group’s objectives, or what it should do to solve a problem. It can be animated, but it is not
personal. Relationship conflict is personal and emotional and tends to be about clashes of the
members of the group. While there has been much research on task (Amason et al., 1997; Cosier
& Rose, 1977; Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996) and relationship (Brewer, 1995,
1996; Labianca, Brass, & Gray, 1998) conflict, what has failed to emerge is a clear picture of
when or what type of conflict is functional or dysfunctional. Task conflict, theorized to be
positive (Gruenfeld et al., 1996; Jehn, 1995, 1997) is found to be negative (De Dreu et al., 2003).
Relationship conflict is seen as always negative, but in other fields that deal with the stability of
continuing relationships, relationship conflict can sometimes be helpful. In the field of marital
counseling, volatile couples who value honest expression of anger, and who also tend to engage
in escalating quarrels, tended to be more stable than those who did not (Gottman, 1993). We
believe that this confusion about the usefulness of conflict types comes from limitations imposed
by the constructs themselves.
1

We use task and relationship conflict for convenience, but we mean task conflict to include cognitive conflict, and
relationship conflict to include emotional conflict. These definitions are functionally equivalent in the papers we
cite.
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What we argue is that claiming conflict will either be task or relationship conflict has
limited our understanding of conflict in general. First, it sets up a false dichotomy. Logically,
there is no reason to claim that conflict could not be over both the task and the people; that is,
that a person challenges the ideas of others, partially because of interpersonal feelings and
partially because they think the idea is bad. Similarly, conflict over a task could not be
interpreted as a personal attack, and therefore engender the same negative feelings. This is, in
fact, what happens when task turns to relationship conflict (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997), but also
can happen in a single instance when one is using a technique such as devil’s advocacy to merely
explore further the nature of an idea (Schweiger, 1989; Schwenk, 1990). This problem is why
Torrance (1957) originally questioned whether people could meaningfully distinguish conflict
about the task and the person.
A more subtle potential problem with the use of task and relationship conflict is that they
are treated as helpful or harmful in and of themselves, when even in the research on task and
relationship conflict (e.g., Jehn et al., 1999) it is the learning that task conflict brings that is
helpful (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1995), and the bad feelings that relationship conflict creates that is
harmful (Jehn et al., 2001). By learning, we mean the synthesis of task relevant information that
the parties may have previously overlooked. “Negative feelings” is a general term we will use to
describe a range of affective reactions from basic emotions (e.g., anger) to more complicated
ones (e.g., apprehension), all of which are unpleasant to experience. We believe that if learning is
the good and negative feelings are the bad outcomes of conflict, then we should examine how
these arise from conflict directly. To do this we need to understand the interplay of the
information and unpleasantness that can produce learning and negative feelings.
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For these reasons, we start with the argument that disagreement over the task and
personality clashes can and often do co-occur in the same disagreement. This implies that a
single instance of conflict will generate some learning and some negative feelings as by products
of the conflict. We think that it is important to understand the effect of these by products as they
accumulate over time. Conflict is a dynamic process where subsequent actions are viewed in
relation to what has already happened (Jehn et al., 2001; Weingart, Prietula, Hyder, & Genovese,
1999). To this point, we believe that as the learning/ negative emotional by products of conflict
accumulate, it can affect amount and usefulness of subsequent conflict. By examining the way
learning and negative feelings result from conflict directly, and by taking into consideration
conflicts that have occurred in the past, we believe we will be able to gain a clearer picture of the
conditions under which conflict will be useful.
In this paper, we begin by defining a conflict event, a single disagreement that can be
bound in terms of time and space, in which task and relationship conflict can occur
simultaneously. We go on to explain how a single conflict event can lead to learning and
negative feelings simultaneously. We then suggest that learning and frustration will both affect
the likelihood of subsequent conflict. Finally, we complete our model by examining how
negative feelings can affect subsequent learning, and vice versa. The model is presented in figure
1. Once we have articulated the model, we describe what this implies for relationships over time
(e.g., partners or groups), and demonstrate this using a computer simulation. We conclude by
discussing the implications of our model for the study of conflict as well as conflict management.
The conflict event
We define a conflict event as a disagreement between two or more parties, acknowledged
by those involved, which can be bound in terms of time. Bound in terms of time means that the

5
experience of the conflict has a definable starting and stopping point (e.g., part of a meeting, a
phone call, etc.). Acknowledged by those involved means that the parties to the conflict event all
recognize that there is a disagreement and that some accommodation will need to take place
before an agreement can be reached. Thus, an example of a conflict event would be a fight
between a subordinate and boss that begins when the subordinate disputes the current bonus
structure for employees in a meeting, and ends with the subordinate storming out.
Since a conflict event is not bound in terms of content (i.e., what it is about), we can
allow a conflict event to contain some portion of task and some portion of relationship conflict.
This conflict can also vary in the degree to which it is emotional. Our notion of a conflict event
fit with Baron’s (1984) observation that “what starts as a rational exchange of opposing views
deteriorates into an emotion laden interchange…in which strong negative feelings are aroused”
(p 272). In this example, task information was exchanged, negative feelings were aroused, and
personal attacks may have surfaced as well, and this was experienced as a single conflict event.
We define a conflict event thusly because we believe it will correspond more to people’s
experience of conflict. By admitting the possibility that both task and relationship elements are
present in a conflict, as well as varying levels of emotion, we can use these as the basis from
which to deduce what the effects of a conflict event will be.
The by-products of conflict events
If we accept that a conflict event can be about the task and about relationships, from this
we can derive the by-products of conflict. Task conflict can produce information as people try to
reconcile their diverse perspectives about how a decision should be made or a problem should be
solved (Amason, 1996; Jehn, 1997). We would also argue that useful information can come from
non-task arguments such as procedures or interpersonal interactions. Here, the same mechanism
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is at work, different perspectives about the processes or people lead others to disclose
information that was previously being overlooked by the other parties, and the incorporation of
that information should improve the way the parties interact. For example, disagreement over
whether one was trying to marginalize another can bring to light information on how people wish
to be treated in a group. When this is incorporated into the group’s interaction patterns, it should
improve the groups functioning.
Relationship conflict will produce some amount of unpleasant feelings in those involved
(Amason et al., 1997; Jehn, 1997), as people do not like being personally attacked. Yet conflict
may be unpleasant for reasons other than personal attack. Some people may not wish to argue
over something they deeply believe should be true. Such a conflict over values may provoke a
person’s sense of morality over the way they believe things ought to be (such as fairness
judgments, see Bies, 1987) or may even be threatening to the ego (Allred, 1999). Finally, some
people simply do not like confrontation and are conflict avoidant. This individual parameter
implies that engaging in a conflict event of any sort will evoke some degree of unpleasantness.
A conflict event can thus be located on a 2 dimensional plan where there is some amount
of task relevant information, and some amount of unpleasantness (figure 2). In this depiction, the
lower right (high information, low unpleasantness) is where task conflict is usually positioned,
and the upper left (low information, high unpleasantness) is where relationship conflict is usually
positioned. Our notion of the conflict event also admits low information, low unpleasantness
conflict, as well as high information, high unpleasantness conflict. Across all types, we postulate
that the information and unpleasantness that surface during the conflict will produce two byproducts, learning and negative feelings.
------------------------------------------Insert figure 2 here
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------------------------------------------The Conflict-Learning Loop. We argue that conflict brings about information, leading to
learning, and as people learn about each other (and the task), they will be better able to work
together productively, thereby decreasing the amount of future conflict. Consider how conflict
can lead to learning. The information surfaced by conflict, if properly synthesized, should lead to
learning (Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Tjosvold, 1985, 1997). Learning between people is
"the activities through which individuals acquire, share and combine knowledge through
experience with one another" (Argote, Gruenfeld, & Naquin, 2001, p. 370). Thus as parties share
their own perspectives and information, it can expand or deepen the capabilities of others,
leading to more adaptive responses. Learning does not have to only be about better ways to do
the task. Parties could learn better ways to interact or communicate with each other, or better
ways to resolve conflicts or make decisions. When people learn better ways to interact or work,
in addition to improving the output of the group, it can have a secondary effect of reducing
conflict.
One way learning should decrease the probability of future conflict is by reducing
misunderstanding between the parties. Misunderstanding can lead to conflict when
communication is misconstrued, and people react to their misunderstanding as though it were the
intended meaning. For example, if person A, intending only to get more clarity, questions person
B’s motives for a decision, person B may misconstrue this question to be a personal attack.
Person B may react and the respond in kind with a personal attack on person A, starting a
conflict spiral (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998). As parties learn about each other, it should reduce
the number of times people make these sorts of errors. The meaning of ideas can be
misconstrued as well. For instance if an engineer says “design a quality (meaning durable) part”
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to a designer, who takes quality to mean finely crafted, conflict can arise after the two realize
they were expecting different objects. As people learn about each other, it becomes easier for
them to understand the nuance of their language, and to anticipate, prepare for, and
accommodate each other’s needs. This should also decrease conflict that comes from people
acting in unexpected or undesired ways.
The Conflict-Negative Feelings Loop. We argue that conflict, in addition to bringing
about information, is going to be experienced as somewhat unpleasant, and that this will lead to a
buildup in negative feelings that over time can prime people for more conflict. The first link in
this is that when people experience the unpleasantness of conflict, it can build up negative
feelings. The most familiar example of this is what happens in relationship conflict where
people’s personalities are attacked. This is an unpleasant experience that can evoke anger,
irritation or annoyance (Amason, 1996; Amason et al., 1997; Pelled, 1996). Yet we argue that
there may be other negative feelings that build as the result of conflict. When resolution to a
conflict is delayed by protracted difficulties, this can be a frustrating experience. Here it is the
inability to get to a resolution rather than anything personal that evokes the unpleasantness, and
the particular feeling is one of frustration. In the case of a less powerful person trying to resolve
an important issue (e.g., a small business owner trying to fight a mistaken IRS decision), it may
be despair rather than frustration that emerges. Finally, some negative feelings may be individual
based. A person who simply is conflict avoidant may just experience displeasure as he or she is
engaged in the conflict, even a relatively mild one. A person in a high status position may feel
affronted that he or she is challenged by a lower status one. Across situations, people, and
conflict types the mix of specific negative feelings may change, but in all cases the conflict itself
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is experienced as unpleasant to some degree, and leaves an emotional residue of feelings that are
on the negative side of the continuum.
When negative feelings build up, it should increase the likelihood of conflict. There are a
number of ways in which negative feelings can provoke conflict. A very simple one is
frustration-aggression (Berkowitz, 1982), when people are frustrated they can lash out.
Frustration has been shown to perpetuate the conflict cycle (De Dreu, Nauta, & van de Vliert,
1995). Another is reciprocity, where people who are experiencing something unpleasant can seek
to return the unpleasantness in kind, especially if they feel justified (Bies, 1987). Negative
feelings may prime people to look for conflict as well. When people are in a negative mood they
are more likely to attend to or remember similarly valenced thoughts (Bower & Forgas, 2001).
Through these different mechanisms, as the amount of negative feelings build, the likelihood of
conflict should increase as well.
Feedback between the loops - The tipping point
If conflict simultaneously increased learning and negative feelings, assuming fairly
similar rates of conflict increasing (through negative feelings) and decreasing (through learning),
it would simply mean that over time you would have a very skilled and surly group. It would do
little to explain why task conflict appears to be mostly ineffective (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003),
and it would imply that conflict would have about the same effect no matter what had happened
before. However, we argue that there is also a feedback loop between learning and negative
feelings, such that negative feelings can reduce learning, and learning can reduce negative
feelings (for evidence of the simultaneity of this relationship in a particular context see, Holman
& Wall, 2002) . This will mean that over time, there is a high likelihood that one loop (learning
or negative feelings) will tend to dominate the other.
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Negative feelings reduce learning. In order for people to learn from the information
given, they must have the capacity and motivation to do so. This is because synthesizing
information into ones own knowledge base is an effortful process (Hasher & Zacks, 1979). When
something decreases cognitive capacity, then less of this type of learning can take place.
Negative emotions can do just that; negative emotions crowds out cognitive capacity for other
learning (Bless & Schwarz, 1999). At the same time, emotion can lead one to either selectively
attend or encode particular (Forgas, 1995) details, thus not comprehending the full story, but
only the affect congruent parts (which would be negative).
In addition to reducing capacity to learn, we argue that negative feelings, especially those
centered on others, will reduce the motivation to learn from them. Here instead of not being able
to process the information given, people will choose not to. This kind of dismissal is more akin
to prejudice (Devine, 1989). It uses surface features to dismiss the usefulness of information
before it is processed. The end result is the same, information that would be useful is not
incorporated into a persons thinking.
Learning reduces negative feelings. As people work through their difficulties, it can
counter some of the negative feelings that have built up. At a fundamental level, we argue that
each “breakthrough” that results from learning should have some degree of satisfaction (or relief)
associated with it. This would operate through the same reinforcement mechanisms used to
design self directed learning programs, where people’s interest and commitment grows through a
series of small successes learning a task (Keller, 1968). When the learning also results in the
overcoming of small disagreements, we expect this to mollify negative feelings as well. Here the
same principles that work for the gradual reduction in tension strategy (Osgood, 1974), where
small concessions help overcome frustration and bolster commitment to a course of action or at
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least promote positive attributions to counter the negative feelings (Lindskold, 1978), would
operate. In short, as people learn about others, it can produce a sense of accomplishment
(especially when the learning solves actual problems) and the positive feelings that this
accomplishment evokes can reduce the negative feelings brought about by the unpleasantness of
conflict.
Conflict over time
Now let us consider the behavior of the entire system over time. With each conflict event,
there is some increase in learning, and some increase in negative feelings. For simplicity, we will
imagine that frustration subsides and learning decays at similar rates (this does not change the
main point of the model). In this system, each loop has the possibility to dominate the other. If
there are more negative feelings than learning, then the information brought about by the conflict
event will go unused as people will not learn from each other. This effectively leaves frustration
and conflict to spiral unabated as there is no learning to “put the brakes” on the conflict-negative
feelings loop. On the other hand, if learning outstrips negative emotion, there will be less
conflict, and the unpleasantness of whatever conflict comes up should be overshadowed by the
learning that takes place. Thus there are fewer chances for conflict to produce unpleasantness,
and the buildup of negative feelings will be diminished. Over time, this model predicts one of
three outcomes.
Outcome 1: Too much negative feelings – group disintegration. In this scenario, learning
happens at a lower rate than the accumulation of negative feelings, and so the frustration
feedback loop overtakes the learning feedback loop. Thus each conflict event feeds the level of
negative feelings, further diminishing learning while begetting more conflict. After a certain
point this group will disintegrate. The level of negative feeling in people will become so
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unpleasant that no one will want to continue in the group, as at a certain level people will begin
to withdraw (Spector & Storms, 1987). Since learning will have long since stopped, there will
little reason (in terms of effectiveness) to try to save the group.
Outcome 2: Too much learning – groupthink. Some groups will seek to minimize all
conflict and negative feelings. This kind of overzealous desire to have group harmony can be
accomplished by inculcating people into the same way of thinking. In this scenario, any conflict
would be an occasion for people to learn how to react to each other so that they avoid conflict in
the future. The outcome here is groupthink (Janis, 1997). As everyone is taught to thing the same
way, negative feelings are avoided but at the high cost of narrowing the group’s range of
thinking. We caution here that what can happen can be insidious, that people can focus on
commonality to the exclusion of anything that might cause conflict. An example is people’s
tendency to focus on shared information (Wittenbaum & Stasser, 1996). As people learn from
each other and about each other, there can be a homogenizing force that simply crowds out
conflict (and by extension frustration). You then get the “happy and ineffective” group that
would rather compromise than find a Pareto-optimal solution.
Outcome 3: The right balance – cohesion and resilience. In our minds, the optimal
situation is where the learning occurs at a high enough rate to control but not eliminate
frustration. This steady state behavior implies that conflicts still occur, and that they are
somewhat difficult to solve (guaranteeing some frustration but also learning when it is solved).
We see this as analogous to the suggestion that for maximal improvement, one should have goals
slightly beyond one’s reach (Locke & Latham, 2002). Like “slightly beyond”, “somewhat
difficult” needs further research to quantify. We can say, however that if the learning in which a
group engages expands the members views (as opposed to refining the current shared view), it

13
should be less likely to descend into groupthink, as pushing these boundaries will create more
questions than answers. At the same time, as the group continues to try and keep their
perspectives integrated, provided the synthesis of ideas is not too disparate, the frustration
created should never rise to that critical detrimental point where learning is choked off by high
amounts of negative feelings. Learning advances at a rate high enough to keep the level down.
A simulation of this model
[The model proposed in this paper can be emulated using systems dynamics. We
plan to create a model in Vensim where we can compare different parameters (rates of
learning, negative feeling buildup, etc.) and demonstrate the three outcomes as a function
of these different parameters. This is still in development]
Implications
Our model expands on the notions of conflict as a dynamic process. The notion that what
happens in conflict depends on what has happened previously is found in the research on conflict
spirals (Brett et al., 1998) and on offer-type reciprocity (Weingart et al., 1999). These processes
occur within single conflict events. Our model expands the general notions to what happens
between conflict events. In a different vein, Jehn and Chatman (2000) have looked at conflict
dynamics by viewing the effects of relationship and task conflict as a function of the proportion
of each type of conflict over a period of time (i.e., multiple conflict events). Our model looks at
this notion within single conflict events (also looking not at task conflict and relationship conflict
directly, but rather their by-products). We hope our theory will contribute to the understanding of
conflict in relation to the history of conflict between parties.
Our model can explain one of the current paradoxes in conflict research, why task
conflict does not produce constructive controversy and in fact is most often negative (De Dreu et
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al., 2003). We have argued that the information imparted by task conflict can be ignored if
frustration is high. Thus the simultaneous presence of a high level of negative feelings would
effectively negate the usefulness of any task relevant information shared. This intuition is
consistent with the finding that trust can help increase the usefulness of task conflict (Simons &
Peterson, 2000), as trust should reduce the unpleasantness of conflict (e.g., people who trust
each other may not make negative attributions about the conflict).
Future research
We see multiple research opportunities in testing the parts of the model we have
presented, as well as to improve the model overall. Although some links are well established
(information improves learning), others are not (negative feelings prevent learning). One could
also try to determine the limits of interdependence between the two loops in the model (e.g., how
much negative feeling can be tolerated before learning is affected). One can also think about
exogenous influences on these processes. One mentioned earlier was trust, which we would
expect would moderate the link between conflict and negative emotion, but may actually work to
decrease misunderstanding (people would be less likely to make negative attributions about the
motives of those they trusted).
At a more general theoretical level we thing our model has implications worth pursuing
with regard to the endpoints of protracted conflict. Intuitively, it seems like the conflict-negative
emotional loop would be most likely to group out of control. We would conjecture that
unpleasantness is more consistent than learning. If that is so, then figuring out how to control that
feedback loop seems critical. Here we would argue that most people concentrate on decreasing
the unpleasantness of conflict (Robinson & Weldon, 1993). Maybe researchers should try to
figure out how to dissipate the negative feeling buildup as well.
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At the practical level, research needs to be done on how to find the balance between
learning and frustration. Are there “warning signs” that can redirect a group when it gets too high
on either frustration or learning? A better question may be simply what controls to put in place to
manage the level of frustration. In this paper we have suggested learning as the countervailing
force, but there are clearly variables exogenous to the model that should help. Is an established
relationship where people are committed enough to each other to “weather the storm”. Maybe
hoping to increase learning as a means to reduce frustration is too uncertain a bet, and other
relational factors (trust, respect) can be used instead.
Our model raises many questions. We hope it serves to untangle some of the confusion
currently existing in the study of conflict, as well as to promote research on conflict as it is
experienced over time.
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Figure 1. Conflict events can be located on this Cartesian plane
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Figure 2. The dynamic model of conflict, learning, and frustration
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